RMM

RdViewer

RdViewer (Rd远控) is remote-control and endpoint-management software from Jinan Kuai'an Network Technology Co., Ltd. (济南快安网络科技有限公司). It supports remote screens, file transfer, terminals, batch management, and self-hosted relay nodes. It is unrelated to the Pierschel RdClient product despite the shared rdclient.exe filename. Huorong reported RdPack silently installing RdViewer in 2023. ESRC reported tax-notification phishing delivering a repackaged client in July 2026, and Rogue Authority separately reported fake Disk Manager installers delivering patched RdViewer clients in October 2026. Campaign artifacts below are not default installation locations or proof that all deployments are malicious.

Tool overview

Category
RMM
Research authors
Michael Haag
Created
2026-10-20
Last modified
2026-10-26
Privileges
Windows service installation requires administrative permissions; interactive components may run as a user
Free / availability
Free personal and self-hosted editions; paid editions are also offered
Verification required
Identity and features verified against vendor documentation and static inspection of the official Windows self-hosted package. Campaign metadata and behaviors were corroborated using public research, VirusTotal records, and existing sandbox reports. Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, and iOS are advertised on the download page; mobile apps are described as controllers for Windows PCs. Unix endpoint installation paths and persistence were not verified. No product binaries were run locally.
Supported platforms
AndroidLinuxWindowsiOSmacOS

Capabilities

Remote desktop controlRemote terminalFile transfer and managementClipboard synchronizationScreen recording and audioBatch endpoint management and screen wallSelf-hosted relay nodes and P2P connectivity

Executables & installation paths

Filename
RdServer.exe
OriginalFileName
RdServer.exe
Description
Server executable in the inspected official RdViewerPro archive; PE version 6.6.4.0, independent of the advertised suite version
Filename
RdClient.exe
OriginalFileName
rdclient.exe
Description
Remote-control client; the correlated July campaign sample has original filename rdclient.exe and impersonates Windows service-host version metadata
Filename
rdService.exe
OriginalFileName
rdservice.exe
Description
Windows service module; the correlated sample identifies product RdViewer 服务程序 and version 6.6.8.0

Installation paths

FORENSIC EVIDENCE

Disk artifacts

File
C:\Program Files (x86)\rdviewer\rdclient\*
Description
Vendor-documented client directory; not established as universal across every current edition
OS
Windows
File
*\rdpro\RdClient.exe
Description
Client under the July campaign's rdpro directory; path suffix generalized from ESRC's reported per-user installation
OS
Windows
File
*\rdpro\rdService.exe
Description
Service module under the July campaign deployment directory
OS
Windows
File
*\rdpro\rdlibw.dll
Description
Remote-screen codec library in the July campaign client package
OS
Windows
File
*\rdpro\cfg.ini
Description
July campaign configuration file scoped to the reported deployment directory; the bare filename is not product-specific
OS
Windows
File
*\rdpro\host.dat
Description
July campaign relay configuration scoped to the reported deployment directory
OS
Windows
File
C:\ProgramData\host\dmservice.exe
Description
Genuine RdViewer service renamed by the October fake Disk Manager builds; campaign-specific path
OS
Windows
File
C:\ProgramData\host\diskmgr.exe
Description
Patched and relabelled RdViewer client in the October fake Disk Manager builds; campaign-specific path
OS
Windows
File
C:\ProgramData\host\cfg.ini
Description
October campaign configuration file, not a vendor-default installation path
OS
Windows
File
C:\ProgramData\host\host.dat
Description
October campaign relay configuration, not a vendor-default installation path
OS
Windows
File
*\RdViewerPro\RdServer.exe
Description
Server executable path inside the official self-hosted ZIP, not a fixed installed path
OS
Windows

FORENSIC EVIDENCE

Registry artifacts

Path
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Rd_Service
Description
RdViewer Windows service key; existing sandbox records show Services\Rd_Service under ControlSet001, normalized here to CurrentControlSet

FORENSIC EVIDENCE

Network artifacts

Description
Official software download host linked by the vendor; this is not evidence of a remote-control session, and self-hosted deployments can use other infrastructure
Domains
  • rdviewer.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com
Ports
  • 443

FORENSIC EVIDENCE

Other artifacts

Type
ServiceName
Value
Rd_Service; vendor-documented as rd_service and corroborated by public research and existing sandbox reports
Type
ReportedServiceDisplayName
Value
RdViewer Client Service; July ESRC campaign display name, not established as the vendor default
Type
ReportedCampaignServiceDisplayName
Value
DMService; October fake Disk Manager campaign display name, not the actual service name or a vendor default
Type
ReportedCampaignEndpoint
Value
204.194.54.118:7788; ESRC's narrative and IOC table agree on port 7788, while its decrypted-configuration table prints 778. July campaign infrastructure, not a vendor default; excluded from DNS-domain indicators.
Type
ReportedCampaignEndpoint
Value
1.14.146.76:7790; October fake Disk Manager build 1 relay reported by Rogue Authority and corroborated by an existing VirusTotal CAPE record; not a vendor default; excluded from DNS-domain indicators.
Type
ReportedCampaignEndpoint
Value
103.64.13.103:7788; October fake Disk Manager build 2 relay corroborated by an existing VirusTotal CAPE record. The report also lists ports 7777 and 7799; only 7788 was independently observed in that record. Not a vendor default; excluded from DNS-domain indicators.
Type
ReportedDropperMD5
Value
0084596140bfc8121401216f3d0873aa
Type
CorrelatedDropperSHA256
Value
5f1c6059cbca3d1ba33c9834e845d290d8bfde3c4e0a37a71207b1a9b31593a7
Type
ReportedClientMD5
Value
122c481e44221fefd34c808ff679b1ba
Type
CorrelatedClientSHA256
Value
5bea7f348d4ff47afb4abbb06909b894434d4df83318780da23bbe49bc0fb233; July campaign RdClient.exe
Type
CorrelatedServiceSHA256
Value
7ed2a077a1ce34fcb182e5135ae75ad7bd96207c3204c9f343095f967bfa109f; one shared genuine service sample correlated with the July chain and renamed dmservice.exe in both October builds
Type
ReportedCampaignLoaderSHA256
Value
e71149d889cc558e6328ea7ce3498cd858c26ab282cda9410ccc51f6275f7da6; October fake Disk Manager build 1
Type
ReportedCampaignClientSHA256
Value
fb60876621b2932fa2681d81a17ce8b79952fa3fb9a7ea77d5ba177433d8d76d; October build 1 patched NetBridge Suite/diskmgr.exe client
Type
ReportedCampaignHostSHA256
Value
dcb372ff16de08fd126d9fceb866343ad03795f58427e4c78e1c837f6cd140d8; October build 1 host.dat
Type
ReportedCampaignConfigSHA256
Value
9db36c4f42395b676d31bf7dad3dce15a3e6f4acf3003f7383fb326c9062c29a; October build 1 cfg.ini
Type
ReportedCampaignLoaderSHA256
Value
b9115303dd3567ac75104a5a3d2bc0ce4fd7d697ebf258e61283cdf708d50133; October fake Disk Manager build 2
Type
ReportedCampaignClientSHA256
Value
bf41e6af51ccba343098f403093b195fb5f238559f723d4088196a2648fb9272; October build 2 patched Disk Manager Corp./diskmgr.exe client
Type
ReportedCampaignHostSHA256
Value
6bf67a040c0da26678b8b574db5f624b6bc3cc446455e3645d8bdaf3ef4517b8; October build 2 host.dat
Type
OfficialPackageSHA256
Value
c081f809350dd836c9cb12257f6975bd69c0e7689d09ad5f471300bac1afd8a4
Type
OfficialServerSHA256
Value
4ed32c1723b0cea3454f9085573f6cacbb371408c0ee700416079a2dad6dce63
Type
OfficialServerEmbeddedCertificateSubject
Value
济南快安网络科技有限公司; extracted from the official package's RdServer.exe Authenticode certificate, not a live trust or revocation validation

Detections

Sigma
https://github.com/magicsword-io/LOLRMM/blob/main/detections/sigma/rdviewer_files_sigma.yml
Description
Detects potential files activity of RdViewer RMM tool
Sigma
https://github.com/magicsword-io/LOLRMM/blob/main/detections/sigma/rdviewer_registry_sigma.yml
Description
Detects potential registry activity of RdViewer RMM tool
Sigma
https://github.com/magicsword-io/LOLRMM/blob/main/detections/sigma/rdviewer_network_sigma.yml
Description
Detects potential network activity of RdViewer RMM tool

References

Acknowledgements

Person
Kyle Cucci
Handle
@d4rksystem
Person
rcKillam
Handle
@rcKillam
Person
ESTsecurity Security Response Center (ESRC)
Handle
Not recorded
Person
Rogue Authority
Handle
Not recorded
Person
Huorong Security
Handle
Not recorded